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THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE OMNIBUS DEFENDANT-Over twenty-eight
per cent. of the 24,000,000 'registered motor vehicles in this country are covered
by casualty insurance." This insurance protects not only the owners of the nearly
7,000,o00 vehicles, but also such others as borrow or drive these cars. It is fre-
quently true that the latter are already protected in fact, since their judgment-
proof condition makes the owner a more logical victim to sue, by virtue of
respondeat superior, the "family purpose" doctrine, or some statute imposing
vicarious liability. 2 Members of this group may thus call on the insurer to pro-
tect them whether the plaintiff is exercising his unusual legal prerogative of suing
the tort feasor when he could recover against the owner, or whether his only
remedy is against the driver, by reason of the inapplicability of any of the theories
of vicarious liability.3 The device that has this magical effect of invoking the
benefits of the automobile casualty insurance policy on others than the named
assured is the "omnibus coverage" clause.4
This clause is now part of practically all automobile liability and indemnity
policies, and in its most common form provides that:
"The insurance granted by the foregoing provisions shall apply to addi-
tional assured as follows: (a) any person while riding in any automobile
described in said declarations or while operating any automobile described
in said declarations with the permission of the assured or any adult member
of the assured's household other than a chauffeur or domestic servant, and
(b) any person, firm or corporation (except automobile repair shop, garage,
automobile sales agency or service station and the agents and employees
thereof) for whom said automobile is being operated: Provided that should
any additional assured be protected by other valid and collectible insurance
then no insurance under this policy shall extend to such additional assured." -
Far from challenging its validity, many courts have recognized the clause as a
desirable addition to the insurance contract as effectuating the public policy em-
bodied in financial- responsibility laws.6 Nor have the legislatures been remiss in
recognizing the greater degree of protection afforded the public through this
increase in the number of the persons covered by the policy.' The consequence is
i. This information was obtained from a prominent casualty insurance company which
prefers to keep its identity unknown.
2. See Note (1932) 8I U. OF PA. L. REv. 6o for a discussion of the various theories of
vicarious liability of an automobile owner.
3. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., Ltd. v. Schmidt, 46 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 6th,
1931); Smith v. United States Fideliiy & Guaranty Co., 1o9 W. Va. 280, 153 S. E. 584
(193o); RIcHARS, LAW OF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) 893.
4. Hammond v. New York Castialty Co., 239 App. Div. 627, 269 N. Y. Supp. 290 (3d
Dep't 1934); see Zuvich v. Ballay, t49 So. 281, 284 (La. App. 1933); Fried v. London
Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd., 136 Misc. 74o, 742, 242 N. Y. Supp. 6o, 63 (Sup. Ct. 93o) ;
5 CoucH, INSURANCE (Supp. 1933) 66; 13-14 HUDDY, CYcLOPEDIA OF AUTromOBiLi LAW
(9th ed. 1931) 405; SUNERLIN, AUTmoBILE INsuRANCE (1929) § 926; (1934) 3 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 343, 345.
5. See Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Bear, 220 Ala. 491, 493, 125 So. 676,
678 (93o). For variations of the clause see Note (193i) 72 A. L. R. 1375 et seq.
6. See Bakker v. Aetna Life In. Co., 264 N. Y. 150, 153, i9o N. E. 327, 328 (1934);
Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 313, 8 S. W. (2d) 473, 477 (1928).
7. For a discussion of omnibus coverage clauses required by statute, see Legis. (1933)
8 Wis. L. Rzv. 349.
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that a policy containing this clause creates, in addition to the usual creditor bene-
ficiary (the injured person), a donee beneficiary in the person of the permitted
driver :8 the named assured exacts the promise of the insurer for the benefit of
the driver-permittee, intending to confer on the latter a right against the insurer
to performance of the terms of the policy.
9 The permitted driver requires this
performance only when it is to protect him against the consequence of an adverse
judgment in a litigation involving his negligence. The circumstances under which
a person not otherwise insured may claim the benefits of the policy then becomes
the principal inquiry.
Broadly stated, the defendant seeking the shelter of the omnibus clause must
have been driving the vehicle with the permission of the named assured or an
adult member of his household.10 As is the case with many broad principles, the
qualifications of this rule exceed in importance the rule itself. These qualifica-
tions fall into one of two large groups: those as to the capacity of the person
granting permission, and those as to the extent of the permission granted.
The numerical weight of authority insists that effective permission can be
granted by the named assured only if he is the owner of the car.", Furthermore,
the bare legal title of a conditional vendor will.not suffice ;12 one court has inti-
mated that the equitable title of the conditional vendee is similarly defective.",
The result is that where the named assured is not the owner of the car, the pro-
tection of the policy cannot extend beyond him, and the omnibus coverage clause
is in effect inoperative. 4 In view of the expressed intention of the parties as
manifested by the inclusion of the clause in the policy, and the circumstance that
the majority holding reduces the coverage without any corresponding decrease in
the premium paid, it would seem that a contrary holding would be more desirable
both as effecting the objective intent of the contracting parties, and in giving the
public a remedy against financially irresponsible drivers.
There is another qualification as to the capacity of the named assured to
grant permission. This is in the situation where the named assured has been
8. See Barsuk v. Independence Indemnity Co., 142 Misc. 26o, -263, 254 N. Y. Supp. 352,
356 (Sup. Ct. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 236 App. Div. 162, 258 N. Y. Supp. 148 (4th
Dep't 1932); American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cone, 257 S. W. 961, 965 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923). But see American Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Trask, 238 App. Div.
668, 671, 266 N. Y. Supp. I, 4 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd. 264 N. Y. 545, 191 N. E. 557 (1934),
criticized in (1934) 3 BROoKLYN L. REV. 343; (1933) 33 Coi- L. REv. 1449.
The RFSTA'IEMENT, CONTRACTS (1929) §139 effectively disposes of the objection
raised in the Trask Case that the purported beneficiary was not named in the policy.
9. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1929) § 133 (I) (a).
I0. Morin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 85 N. H. 471, 16o Atl. 482 (1932); Bro v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co., 194 Wis. 293, 215 N. W. 431 (1927) ; 5 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 4, at
67; RICHARDS, loc. cit. supra note 3; SUNDERLIN, op. Cit. supra note 4, at § 928.
By a curious misinterpretation of the omnibus coverage clause, one court held that
before an injured person can recover against the insurer, the injured person must have
been riding in the vehicle with the permission of the named assured: Rhodes v. Ocean
Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 239 App. Div. 92, 266 N. Y. Supp. 681 (4th Dep't 1933),
aff'd, 264 N. Y. 437, 191 N. E. 502 (1934).
ii. Whitney v. Employers Indemnity Corp., 20o Iowa 25, 2o2 N. W. 236 (1925);
Giroud v. New Jersey Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., io6 N. J. L. 238, 148 Atl. 790
(1930); Fagg v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Ore. 358, 19 P. (2d) 413 (933); see
Wigington v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 12o Neb. 162, 164, 231 N. W. 770, 771
(1930); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S. E. 414 (1931). Contra: Ocean
Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Bear, 22o Ala. 491, 125 So. 676 (1930).
12. Whitney v. Employers Indemnity Corp., 2oo Iowa 25, 202 N. W. 236 (1925).
13. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S. E. 414 (1931).
14. See Wigington v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 120 Neb. 162, 164, 231
N. W. 770, 771 (193o). But see Clarno v. Gamble-Robinson Co., 19o Minn. 256, 260, 25,
N. W. 268, 270 (1933). Cf. Fox v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 239 App.
Div. 671, 268 N. Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dep't 1934) ; (1934) II N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 649.
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wont to permit a designated person to use his car, and the named assured dies.
Such permission ceases upon the death of the named assured, and unless there-
after the legal representatives of the named assured give permission to the driver
to use the vehicle, the lack of permission makes the omnibus clause inoperative.15
The power of the named assured to grant permission is otherwise unrestricted.
There are, however, others than the named assured who are, by the usual
omnibus clause, enabled to grant the requisite permission-for instance, "any
adult member of the assured's household". Thus the act of an adult son of the
named assured in one instance,' 6 and of a brother of the named assured in an-
othery7 has been considered as bringing the permittee within the terms of the
omnibus clause. Since an adult member of the household may successfully per-
mit another to operate the vehicle, he may himself use the vehicle without the
express permission of the named assured.' This leaves undecided the situation
where he uses it in spite of the express prohibition by the named assured, but
since other decisions indicate the judicial belief that the insurer is contracting for
the named assured's conscious choice, it is unlikely that the adult member of the
household would be protected.
Where the permission has been obtained from one neither the named assured,
nor an adult member of his household, but from a person whose permission was
in turn derived from either of them, the decisions are as variable as the factual
situations. One situation appears more frequently than others; in Odden v.
Union Indemnity Co.,'9 the named assured lent his automobile to one H, his
employee, for business and pleasure. While on an excursion in the latter field, H
permitted B to drive, and by reason of B's negligence, the plaintiff was injured.
He sued and recovered a judgment against both H and B, and then sought to
apply the insurance policy to the unsatisfied judgment. The plaintiff succeeded,20
but in an action by another person injured in the same accident, recovery was
denied. 2' The court distinguished. the former case on the ground that the trial
jury there found the fact of permission granted by the named assured to be
broader than in the latter.2 These conflicting results cannot be reconciled by the
usual resort to placing the onus on judicial distrust of plaintiff-riders in the
insured vehicle, since in all but one case,2 the plaintiffs were riding in the insured
vehicle. In a situation somewhat the converse of this, where the named assured
grants permission to A to use the car, but insists that someone other than A drive,
A is neither privileged to drive, 24 nor to permit the authorized driver to use the
I5. Hobbs v. Cunningham, 273 Mass. 529, I74 N. E. 181 (1930); Frankel v. Allied
Mutuals Liability Ins. Co., I92 N. E. 517 (Mass. 1934).
If this concept of permission is carried to its logical conclusion, it would appear that
if immediately after the permission has been granted the named assured dies, the omnibus
defendant (and the injured plaintiff) is without prote&ion.
16. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., Ltd. v. Schmidt, 46 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 6th,
193I).
17. Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., lO Conn. 369, 125 Atl. 866 (i924).
18. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall, 237 Ky. 393, 35 S. W. (2d) 550
(i931) ; see Union Indemnity Co. v. Small, 154 Va. 458, 465, 153 S. E. 685, 687 (193o).
i9. 156 Wash. 1o, 286 Pac. 59 (1930).
2o. Accord: Guzenfield v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., i9o N. E. 23 (Mass. 1934) (plaintiff
had recovered judgment only against the employee) ; Blair v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 192 N. E.
467 (Mass. 1934).
21. Trotter v. Union Indemnity Co., 33 F. (2d) 363 (XvV. D. Wash. 1929), aff'd, 35 F.
(2d) 104 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
22. Accord: American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 6o5, 45 S. W. (2 ) 52
(1932) ; cf. Johnson v. O'Lalor, 279 Mass. io, i8o N. E. 525 (1932).
23. Guzenfield v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 190 N. E. 23 (Mass. 1934).
24. Bowen V. Soucy, 2 F. Supp. 481 (D. N. H. 1933), aff'd, sub nom. Bowen v. Cote,
69 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
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car for other than A's use, 25 without forfeiting his rights under the clause. On
the other hand, the named assured may expressly authorize another to grant the
requisite permission,2 6 or subsequently ratify the act.
27
Though the driver-permittee who now seeks the benefit of the omnibus clause
has received permission from a person legally capable of granting it, there still
remains the problem of whether the nature and extent of the permission granted
encompassed the negligent act. The decisions on this point show a definite
divergence in judicial theory. One group 28 follows the lead of Dickinson v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 29 a case holding that a considerable deviation by the per-
mittee from the authorized act is within the permission granted, even to the point
of regarding as "permitted" a completely new act starting after completion of the
authorized act.30 In the case which enunciates this extreme view, the court says:
"The logical result of the reasoning employed in . . .Dickinson v. Mary-
land Casualty Co. is to construe the language of the policy so as to afford
indemnity to persons using the automobile covered by the policy with the
permission of the named insured, regardless of whether the permission ex-
tended to its use in the particular manner and at the particular place which
produced the accident and resultant injury." 31
The other group, 2 led by Denny v. Royal Indemnity Co.," in effect considers the
limits of permission granted under the omnibus clause co-extensive with the devi-
ations allowed under the theory of respondeat superior."4 However justifiably
enlarged the ambit of permission has become because of the constant endeavor
to give security for payment of damages to injured persons, no court has flown
in the face of an express limitation by the permittor as to the use of the vehicle. 35
The omnibus defendant, after affirmatively proving requisite permission, has
still other obstacles to overcome. He must have complied with the conditions
of the omnibus clause and of the policy as a whole. These conditions are vari-
ously operative prior and subsequent to the accident. A condition of the first sort
that was for some time included in all omnibus clauses, was that the permitted
driver must have been "legally operating" the vehicle at the time of the accident.
The courts have held uniformly that the permittee's conduct in driving without a
license does not constitute a breach of this condition. Some courts ground their
decisions on the lack of causal connection between the accident and the absence
25. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 158 Va. 834, 164 S. E. 539 (1932).
26. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Waldman, 53 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
27. Boyer v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359, 178 N. E. 523 (1931).
28. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ronan, 37 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 2d, 293o); Zuvich v.
Ballay, 149 So. 281 (La. App. 1933); Theriot v. Tassin, 146 So. 729 (La. App. 1933);
Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 232 N. W. 790 (293o); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Hoge, 153 Va. 204, 149 S. E. 448 (1929) ; see Drewek v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co.,
207 Wis. 445, 447, 24o N. W. 88I, 882 (1932).
29. IO Conn. 369, 125 Atl. 866 (1924).
30. Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 302, 8 S. V. (2d) 473 (2928).
31. Id. at 313, 8 S. W. (2d) at 477.
32. Fredriksen v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 26 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A.
9th, I928) ; Johnson v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 131 Me. 288, 161 Atl. 496 (2932).
33. 26 Ohio App. 566, 159 N. E. iO7 (1927).
34. But cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall, 237 Ky. 393, 396, 35 S. W.
(2d) 550, 55i (2931) (inapplicability of family purpose doctrine did not decide the question
of permission).
35. Soukup v. Halmel, 192 N. E. 557 (Ill. 1934); Kazdan v. Stein, 26 Ohio App. 455,
16o N. E. 5o6 (1927), aff'd, I18 Ohio St. 217, 16o N. E. 704 (1928); Union Indemnity Co.
v. Small, 154 Va. 458, 153 S. E. 685 (193o) ; Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13 P. (2d)
55 (1932).
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of the license.3 6  Another court bases its holding on the legal conclusion that
under the same circumstances the insurer could not deny liability for the act of
the named assured.3 7 A third group, using the well-worn maxim that ambiguities
in a policy will be construed against the insurer, insists that the insurer should
specify among the express exclusions of the policy this situation.3 8 The insurers,
relying on this last admonition, have generally excluded coverage where the per-
mitted driver was under legal driving age and under sixteen in any event; in this
they have enjoyed indifferent success. 39 Similarly, the attempt to raise the defense
that the permittee was not "legally operating" because he was intoxicated, has
been unsuccessful.4 0 As a consequence of the unique regularity with which this
condition has been held ineffective, many insurers have abandoned the use of the
word "legally". 1
Another condition frequently expressed in the omnibus clause is that restrict-
ing coverage to the use of the vehicle in a manner specified in the policy, and
excluding coverage where the permittee is connected with a garage, repair shop,
service station or sales agency. This latter condition has been given full force 42
with but one unjustifiable exception. This was in the case of Asnis v. Bankers'
Indenity Insurance Co.,4 8 where the operator of a garage borrowed the named
assured's car and had it driven by one of his own employees. The employer was
riding in the car when the employee's negligent driving injured the plaintiff. After
a successful suit against the employer on grounds of respondeat superior, the
injured plaintiff sought to apply the insurance policy against the unsatisfied judg-
ment through the omnibus coverage clause. The express exclusion of garage-
men in the policy clearly dictated a judgment in favor of the insurer. Never-
theless, the New Jersey court contrived to reach the wrong conclusion by the
adroit reasoning that although the permittee did not come under the protection of
the clause as one for whom the car was being operated, he did qualify as a person
riding in the automobile, under the first portion of the clause. But his liability
to the plaintiff had arisen by virtue of his being an employer, and had nothing to
do with the fact that he was riding in the car. The decision, logically impossible
to defend, is explicable only on the theory that the court wanted to, and did, hold
against the insurer without regard for principles of construction. There is, how-
ever, a reasonable limitation where the named assured gives permission to a
36. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hoge, i53 Va. 2o4, 149 S. E. 448 (1929); Odden v.Union Indemnity Co., t56 Wash. Io, 286 Pac. 5g (93o) ; see Bowen v. Soucy, z F. Supp.
48r, 483 (D. N. H. 1933), aff'd, sub nora. Bowen v. Cote, 69 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. ist,1934).
37. Fagiani v. Gen. Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., lO5 Cal. App. 274, 287
Pac. 377 (1930).
38. Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Benoit, 67 F. (2d) 5z (C. C. A. 9th, 1933);
Osborn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., ii N. J. L. 358, 168 At. 416 (933) ; see Kautz
v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 293 Pac. 133, 135 (Cal. App. I93O), rev'd on
other grounds, 212 Cal. 576, 300 Pac. 34 (1931).
39. In two cases, Firkins v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co., Ltd., iii 'Cal.
App. 655, 295 Pac. IO51 (I931), and Swift v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co.,
Ltd., i12 Cal. App. 709, 297 Pac, 578 (93), this provision was unsuccessful. In two
other cases, it was given effect: Weiss v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 241 App. Div. 545,
272 N. Y. Supp. 653 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Cullen v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 467, 253 N. W.
382 (x934). The insurers were clearly victims of judicial misinterpretation in the first two
cases.
40. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins.- Co. v. Thompson, 49 F. (2d) 86o (C. C. A.
9th, 1931) ; see Kautz v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 293 Pac. 133, 135 (Cal.
App. 1930), rezvd ou other grounds, 212 Cal. 576, 300 Pac. 34 (193I).
41. Supra note 5.
4?. State v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 156 Md. 684, 145 Ad. x82 (1929); Wendt v.
Wallace, 185 Minn. i89, 24o N. AV. 470 (1932); Alberga v. Pa. Indemnity Corp., 114 Pa.
Super. 42, 173 Atl. 697 (1934).
43. Io N. J. L. x34, 164 Atl. 3o7 (1933).
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garage employee for a personal mission.44 There has been a parallel effective
exclusion of coverage where the automobile, in contravention of the terms of the
policy,45 was used for hire. The potency of expressed exclusions is best illus-
trated by those cases where the policy contained a condition limiting the use of
the vehicle to the business of the named assured. The holdings giving full effect
to this condition by denying the benefit of the insurance where the permittee used
the car for his own purpose 46 are unfortunate. The omnibus clause is thus made
inoperative except insofar as it extends coverage to the tortfeasor if the injured
plaintiff chooses to sue him instead of imposing vicarious liability on the named
assured. In Georgia Casualty Co. v. Waldnan,47 the court refused to limit a
condition of use for "pleasure and business purposes" to those of the named
assured, but construed the words as including the "pleasure" of the permitted
driver. This decision might control in a similar expansion of the condition as to
business use, were it not for the naive limiting explanation of the court: since the
named assured was a corporation, and a corporation is unable to experience
pleasure, the "pleasure" contemplated in the "use" clause must have been the
pleasure of the permittees. The success of the insurer in limiting its liability under
the policy by "use" conditions apparently requires unambiguous language in the
conditions. Thus where the policy specified that the vehicle was to be "principally
used in Mill Valley", the court effectively emasculated this condition by leaving
the question of principal use to the jury to find as a fact.48 In view of the unsym-
pathetic attitude of juries toward insurance companies, the result is not difficult
to foretell. An unambiguous provision that the policy shall not cover injuries
suffered by employees, was effective in saving harmless both the insurer and
named assured in a situation where the named assured's employee, operating the
vehicle on the business of the named assured, injured a co-worker.4  The named
assured was held not liable to the injured person because of the fellow-servant
doctrine, and the insurer was not liable because of the express exclusion in the
policy; thus the injured co-worker was left to the tender mercies of the work-
men's compensation laws. It is not difficult to see how readily the oft-expressed
intent of the omnibus clause, that of giving protection to both the permitted driver
and the injured person 50 is negatived by the inclusion of conditions such as the
foregoing. This has led to statutory prohibition of restrictions on the coverage
of the omnibus clause.
5 1
In addition, there are conditions in the policy operative after an accident has
occurred, and while they do not specify that the additional assureds are bound to
observe them, nevertheless their breach may exclude the driver-permittee from
the protection of the policy. A common example of this sort of condition is that
the insurer be properly notified of the accident. The decisions involving this
question are by no means uniform. In two" cases where the policy required the
44. Barry v. Sill, ii Minn. 71, 253 N. W. 14 (1934).
45- Cartos v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., I6o Va. 5o5, 169 S. E. 594 (I933);
cf. Drewek v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 207 Wis. 445, 24o N. W. 881 (1932).
46. Williams v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 44 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930);
Snyder v. National Union Indemnity Co., 65 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. xoth, 1933); Johnston
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 2oo N. C. 763, 158 S. E. 473 (ig3i).
47. 53 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
48. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Thompson, 49 F. (2d) 86o (C. C.
A. 9th, 1931) ; Kautz v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co., Ltd., 293 Pac. 133 (Cal.
App. 193o), rev'd on other grounds, 212 Cal. 576, 300 Pac. 34 (193I); cf. Enders v. Clarke,
43 Ohio App. 253, 183 N. 1E. 83 (932).
49. Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, i54 So. 279 (Miss. 1934); Bernard v. Wisconsin
Automobile Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 133, 24s N. W. 20o (1932).
50. Supra note 6; see Zuvich v. Ballay, 149 So. 281, 284 (La. App. 1933).
51. Legis. (i933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 349, 352.
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"assured" to give notice, as without specifying whether "assured" included per-
mittees or was limited to the named assured, the language of the court indicated
the broader interpretation.52  But since the permitted driver had in fact given
notice in both cases, these dicta are no more than persuasive authority in those
instances where the driver has not given notice, or a person other than he has
supplied the requisite notification. Where no notice whatever has been given,
this is held to be a clear breach of a condition precedent to the insurer's liability
for the loss.53 If notice of the accident has been given by the named assured 54
or the injured plaintiff,55 the condition of notice is deemed satisfied, and with
reason. If the insurer is notified in fact, he is not prejudiced by the failure of
the permittee to inform him. Moreover, should the omnibus defendant be
ignorant of his eligibility for protection under the named assured's policy, the
courts extend him a reasonable time, after discovery of his situation, within which
to apprise the insurer.56 The justice of this holding is apparent and the analogy
between the omnibus defendant and a beneficiary of a life insurance policy lends
capable support,57 but to this extent the insurer is in a less favorable position, and
assumes a greater quantum of risk through the medium of the omnibus coverage
clause.
If the insurer contracts to defend the assured in any suit arising out of the
operation of the vehicle, the policy generally provides that the "assured" shall
cooperate in such defense. Again there arises a problem of construction: if by
reason of the omnibus coverage clause the insurer is bound to defend the per-
mittee against the claim of the injured plaintiff, whether the permittee is bound
to assist in defense of the suit. Clearly, where there is no express requirement
that the assured cooperate, the court will not impose the duty on the permittee. s
Where, however, there is such a provision in the policy, the beneficiary of the
omnibus clause must cooperate,59 if the insurer requests that he do so.60  In
Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Forrest,61 the insurer refused to defend the permittee
who suffered judgment by default. The injured plaintiff sued to apply the insur-
ance policy against the unsatisfied judgment. The insurer entered the farcical
plea that the permittee had failed to cooperate, when in fact the insurer itself had
balked. The court naturally disposed of this defense with no difficulty and held
for the plaintiff. On the other hand, the permittee's refusal to be defended by
the insurer is regarded as a breach of the cooperation condition:62 since the
52. Bachman v. Independence Indemnity Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 297 Pac. 11o (1931);
McClellan v. Madonti, 313 Pa. 515, z69 AtL. 760 (1934); cf. Slavens v. Standard Accident
Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) ; Bernard v. Wisconsin Automobile Ins. Co.,
210 Wis. 133, 245 N. W. 200 (1932).
Another court is not so certain: Sheldon v. Bennett, 282 Mass. 24o, 247, 184 N. E. 722,
724 (1933).
53. Clements v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 41 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 8th, i93o);
Sheldon v. Bennett, 282 Mass. 24o, x84 N. E. 722 (1933).
54. Baker v. Fox, 7o S. W. (2d) 72 (Mo. App. 1934).
55. Slavens v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
56. Bachman v. Independence Indemnity Co., 112 Cal. App. 486, 298 Pac. 57 (193);
see Scott v. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 352 Ill. 572, 578, 186 N. E. 176, 178 (1933).
57. Id. at 579, 186 N. E. at 179.
58. Bachman v. Independence Indemnity Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 297 Pac. io (I93I).
59. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Blue, 239 Ala. 37, 121 So. 25 (1929) ; see Black-
wood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 24 Ala. App. 527, 529, 137 So. 467, 468 (93); Goergen
v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., H7 Conn. 89, 91, 166 Atl. 757, 758 (933); Barry v.
Sill, ig1 Minn. 71, 77, 253 N. V. 14, 17 (1934). But see Bernard v. Wisconsin Automobile
Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 133, 137, 245 N. W. 200, 201 (1932).
6o. Blackwood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 24 Ala. App. 527, 137 So. 467 (1931).
61. 44 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, I93O).
62. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Morris, 37 F. (2d) go (C. C. A. 9th, 1929), cert. degied,
281 U. S. 748 (i93o).
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injured plaintiff has no greater rights than his judgment debtor in a suit against
the insurer, this breach may successfully be pleaded by the latter. Furthermore,
even if the insurer assumes the defense of the permittee, and leaves him stranded
midway during trial, the permittee must continue to defend the suit in good faith
or he will be guilty of a breach of his duty to cooperate.6"
The cause of the omnibus defendant (and his judgment creditor) is not a
hopeless one, though he has failed in some one of these conditions. Even if the
driver's permission has not extended to the operation of the vehicle at the time
of the accident, the insurer may be estopped to deny the fact of permission if it
defends the driver when he is sued by the injured plaintiff. 64 The insurer by
defending without reservation waives the condition of notice, though notice was
given late, 5 or not at all.6  Similarly, though in the midst of the trial the omnibus
defendant disappears, or makes damaging statements, the insurer by continuing
with the trial without reservation waives the condition of cooperation.67  The
insurer, however, does not necessarily lose its privilege of disclaiming liability by
defending the permittee in such a suit. The privilege may be retained by an
express stipulation to that effect during the trial.68  That the courts do not hesi-
tate to give full effect to the express conditions of the policy is evidenced by the
holdings that nothing short of actual defense of the original suit by the insurer
will waive a condition of the policy. This rule prevails even where the waiver is
made by an accredited agent or where the insurer agrees, but ultimately fails, to
defend the suit.69
Notwithstanding this bristling hedge of qualifications and limitations, the
protection of the omnibus coverage clause is readily accessible, and the clause
usually effectuates its obvious intent-the protection of the additional assureds
in the same manner as the named assured.70 A survey of the decisions in which
the omnibus defendant claims the protection of the policy illustrates that, except
for situations where he has disabled himself by breach of a positive, unambiguous
condition, he has succeeded in obtaining that protection. But he must be wary
of one pitfall-the judicial penchant for grasping the straw of "expressed intent".
It may deprive him of the very protection he seeks. An unfortunate example of
this was the holding in Amnerican Lumbermen's Mutuml Casualty Co. v. Trask.71
There was the usual subrogation clause in the policy, giving the insurer any rights
which the "assured" might enjoy against the person responsible for the loss.
Through the negligence of the driver, losses were incurred which the driver and
the named assured agreed to share. The insurer properly paid the named
63. Snyder v. Nat. Union Indemnity Co., 65 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933), cert.
denied, 29I U. S. 665 (i934).
64. Peterson v. Maloney, i8i Minn. 437, 232 N. W. 790 (1930); Horn v. Common-
wealth Casualty Co., 1o5 N. J. L. 616, 147 Atl. 483 (1929). Contra: Denny v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 26 Ohio App. 566, i59 N. E. IO7 (ig27).
65. Scott v. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 352 Ill. 572, 186 N. E. 176 (933).
66. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 237 Ky. 43, 34 S. W. (2d) 938
(i93i).
67. Goergen v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 89, i66 Atl. 757 (1933);
Francis v. London Guarantee & Accident Corp., Ltd., 100 Vt. 425, 138 Atl. 78o (1927);
see Blackwood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 24 Ala. App. 527, 530, 137 So. 467, 469 (i93I).
68. Bowen v. Soucy, 2 F. Supp. 481 (D. N. H. 1933), aff'd, sub nom. Bowen v. Cote,
69 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934) ; Wigington v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., i2o
Neb. 162, 231 N. W. 77o (i93o).
69. Williams v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 44 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930);
see Cullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 467, 473, 253 N. W. 382, 384 (i934).
70. In one sense the permittee is in a better position than the named assured, since the
latter pays for the protection of both.
71. 145 Misc. 727, 26o N. Y. Supp. 789 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 238 App. Div. 668, 26
N. Y. Supp. i (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 545, 191 N. E. 557 (934).
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assured's portion, but instead of protecting the driver under the omnibus coverage
clause, the insurer sued the driver for what it had paid on the claim against the
named assured and recovered.7 2  The court performed this awesome judicial feat
by utilizing the subrogation clause and giving the insurer the rights which the
named assured would have had against the delinquent driver. By this decision
the additional assured, far from securing protection from the omnibus clause,
was not only required to shoulder the entire cost of the accident, but was saddled
with the expense of two lawsuits.
Aside from this and a few other isolated exceptions, the courts have recog-
nized in the omnibus clause an excellent tool for expanding the security offered
injured plaintiffs.73 To this extent they may properly claim to be in step with
the legislative response to the demand for increased financial responsibility on the
part of motor vehicle operators.
74
H.K.M.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DOCTRINE OF Earp's Appeal 1 -
Trusts created in corporate stock with a life tenancy in the income and a re-
mainder over have attained great popularity along with the increasingly wide-
spread participation in corporate ownership. In framing wills which create such
trusts 2 testators have invariably attempted to anticipate the remotest contingen-
cies of survivorship among possible beneficiaries; yet in regard to the principal
purpose of the trust they have almost uniformly neglected to stipulate any direc-
tions beyond providing that the life tenant receive the income.3 As a result, the
courts meet a problem of great difficulty whenever they are required to determine
the extent of the life tenant's interest in any increment accruing to the trust fund
by reason of such eventualities as an extraordinary cash or stock dividend, a
liquidation of the assets of the corporation, or the issuance to shareholders of
rights to subscribe for new stock. The impelling consideration in the mind of
72. An extension of this holding would gladden the hearts of the insurers since it
would give them an opportunity to recoup the payments made under the omnibus clause.
The holding was soundly criticized in (1934) 3 BROOxLYN L. REV. 343; (1933) 33 Cor- L.
REV. x449.
73. So much so, that it is conceivable that insurers who recognize that what they in-
cluded in the policy originally as a "selling point" has become a considerably expensive
risk, may either remove some of the elasticity from the clause by express restrictions, or
increase the premium.
This latter course will impose a heavier vicarious liability on the named assured. See
Note (1932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 6o, 65.
74. Twenty-two states have adopted financial responsibility laws: INsuRANcE BAR (9th
ed. I934) 307.
The farthest step in the direction of judicially-expanded responsibility was taken in
Bachman v. Independence Indemnity Co., 214 Cal. 529, 6 P. (2d) 943 (931), rev'g 297
Pac. iup (Cal. App. I93I), with a holding that the administrator of the deceased named
assured could recover from the insurer for the death of the named assured resulting from
the negligence of the driver-permittee.
1. 28 Pa. 368 (857). The scope of this note does not include an analysis of computa-
tions under the Pennsylvania doctrine. For a discussion of this phase of the subject see
Evans, Calculating the Distribution of a Stock Dividend between Life Tenant and Corpus
(I929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 981.
2. For reasons of convenience and clarity all trusts will be treated here as testamentary
since the same principles are applied both to testamentary and inter vkvos trusts.
3. The trust deed or will usually stipulates merely that the life tenant is to receive the
income, issue, rents, increase, dividends or other words of the same general character. In
Earp's Appeal the testator directed that "rents, income and interest" be awarded to the life
tenant.
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the court in facing such a situation is the importance of fulfilling the testator's
wishes ;4 but since it is apparent in the usual case that the problem confronting
the judge was not considered by the testator,5 the court is generally forced to
utilize some other criterion in reaching a decision. Thus, while a court professes
to give effect to the intention expressed in the will, in reality it decides the case
by application of some arbitrary rule or by making an equitable compromise
between the interests of the life tenant and the remainderman.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania early committed itself to the latter
approach in Earp's Appeal." There the testator's estate included corporate stock
upon which large surplus profits, over and above current dividends, had accumu-
lated both before and after his decease. Some time after his death and during
the life tenancy, the capital stock was increased, paid for out of the accumulated
profits, and distributed to the shareholders in proportion to their holdings. The
value of the individual shares after the declaration of the stock dividend was
thereby depressed to a figure lower than that at the date of testator's death, but
the value of the total shares held in trust after the dividend was far greater than
at that time. It was decided that the profits accumulated by the corporation after
testator's death belonged to the life tenant as income while those earned before
his decease accrued to the corpus 7 of the estate as principal. Therefore, since
the stock dividend was issued from profits accumulated both before and after
the incidence of the life tenancy it was necessary to apportion the new shares
between income and corpus. This was effected by allotting to principal a portion
of the dividend sufficient to maintain the value of the estate as it existed at tes-
tator's death-generally called th'e intact value-and awarding the- remaining
shares to income. The decision was founded on the theory that since under the
will the life tenant was entitled upon distribution to any profits earned by the
corporation which accrued to the stock held in trust, he had a present right to
that portion of the stock dividend not required for the maintenance of the original
principal of the estate. The fact that a division of profits had been postponed
for some time was held immaterial to the determination of the life tenant's inter-
est in the fund. It was held equally unimportant that the distribution was made
in the form of share certificates rather than in cash.'
Although the Pennsylvania courts have consistently professed to follow the
doctrine of apportionment as formulated in Earp's Appeal,9 the technique applied
in that decision has been subjected to many refinements. In that case market
value was accepted as the sole criterion of the actual value of the stock, no attempt
having been made to ascertain the amount of actual earnings accumulated both
4. ". . . the intent of the grantor or testator is the pole star for the guidance of the
courts." Boyer's Appeal, 2z4 Pa. 144, at 153, 73 Atl. 320, at 323 (I99).
5. It is not plausible to assume that the testator anticipated any division of profits in a
manner other than through an ordinary, regularly-declared cash dividend. If the contrary
were true the directions given in the will would be highly inadequate for the purpose of
solving the more intricate situations noted.
6. 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
7. Throughout this note corpus will be used synonymously with the interest of the
remainderman: income as synonymous with that of the life tenant.
8. The court said; ". . . [the life tenants] have no right whatever to claim the
income' which had accumulated before his death . . . It is equally clear that the profits
arising since the death of the testator are 'income' within the meaning of the will and should
be distributed among the [life tenants] . . . The omission to distribute [the profit] semi-
annually, as it accumulated, makes no change in its ownership. The distribution of it
among the shareholders in the form of new certificates has no effect whatever upon the
equitable right to it . . . Its character cannot be changed by the evidences given to secure
it." Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, at 374 (1857).
9. Flaccus's Estate, 283 Pa. 185, isg9 At.. 74 (1925); Harkness's Estate, 283 Pa. 464,
129 Atl. 458 (1925) ; Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562 (1926).
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before and after the inception of the trust.10 In due time, however, this specu-
lative and highly variable standard was replaced by the more factual one of actual
or intrinsic value." Although the latter has been maintained in subsequent deci-
sions, 12 the court has in fact been content to base its calculations on the less
ambitious but more practical medium of book value. 3  If it can be shown that
the book value of the shares is founded upon erroneous calculations or false
values, a corrected value will be accepted,14 but the burden of proving this is not
a light one.'5 Nor will an "average" or estimated book value be accepted as a
basis for computation.'6
The method of assigning the label of income or principal to various sources
of increased value has likewise been the subject of a refining process. Whereas
the entire increase in value of the stock was assumed to have resulted from earned
profits in the leading case, the measure of income to be awarded to the life tenant
was soon confined to that portion of the increase which could be shown to be due
to actual profits earned during the tenancy.'7 A presumption that all dividends
are prima facie income, however, favors the life tenant.' The exact meaning
of the term "profits" for the purpose at hand is not easily gleaned from the deci-
sions on this point. As already indicated, it is fundamental to the Pennsylvania
doctrine that profits earned after the creation of the trust accrue to income when
distributed, regardless of the fact that they have been permitted to accumulate
over a long period of time. It would therefore seem a correct extension of the
rule to hold that earnings assimilated into capital assets but later distributed, also
accrue to income,19 since the act of the corporation cannot change the relative
rights of the life tenant and remainderman. But where the dividend is declared
from profits accruing to the corporation not from the operation of its business
but from a sale of capital assets or from the enhancement in value of such assets
io. The market value of the stock at the date of testator's death was taken as the intact
value. This involved the assumption that the difference in market value and par value was
the exact measure of the earnings of the corporation.
ii. Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877).
I. Packer's Estate (No. 1), 291 Pa. 194, 197, 139 Atl. 867 (1927) ; Jones v. Integrity
Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 155, x4o Atl. 862, 864 (1528). In these cases the Supreme Court
discarded market value in favor of intrinsic or actual value. But cf. Stoke's Estate (No. x),
24o Pa. 277, 285, 87 Atl. 97., 974 (1913), in regard to market value as evidence of actual
value.
13. Although in many cases actual value is said to be the only standard acceptable to
the court, computations based on book value have been accepted without comment. Flaccus's
Estate, 283 Pa. 185, 129 AtI. 74 (1925) ; Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 131 Atl. 714 (1926).
14. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 148 Atl. 9o7 (193o).
15. In Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 148 Atl. 907 (I93O), cited note 14 supra, the Supreme
Court would not allow the claim of the remainderman that an amount for goodwill be added
to the book value even though this item had appeared on the books of the company both
before and after testator's death.
16. See Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 42, 148 At. 9o7, 9o8 (1930). In Jones v. Integrity
Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 14o Atl. 862 (z928), where stock in a corporation was bought on
three separate occasions at different prices, the court would not accept an averaged intact
value for all the shares. But cf. Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. 206, 165 Atd. 31 (1932), where the
court allowed the taking of an average yearly earning on a per diem basis in order to get
the intact value.
17. See Connolly's Estate (No. I), 198 Pa. 137, 143, 47 At. 1125, 1127 (1909). "Earn-
ings include not only the profits in the regular business but also those from miscellaneous
sources." Waterhouse's Estate, 3o8 Pa. 422, at 428, 162 Atl. 295, at 296 (1932).
18. "An extraordinary corporate dividend is presumptively payable to the party entitled
to the income at the time the dividend was declared." McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, at
86, io6 Atl. i89, at 19I (1919).
i9. It was so held in Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 44r, 154 Atl. 814 (i931); Boyer's
Appeal, 224 Pa. x44, 73 Atl. 32o (19o9) ; Cassatt's Estate, 1o5 Pa. Super. 14, 158 Atl. 586
(1932).
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such profit belongs to the principal of the fund.2 0  Thus a contributed surplus
received by the corporation from the sale of newly created stock above-the par
value will accrue to corpus when distributed.21 Although there is an apparent
conflict in the cases regarding the status of profits accruing from the sale of
capital assets,22 the actual decisions can be reconciled. Thus it is quite proper
that the life tenant ordinarily is refused a share in the increment of such a sale
since it is obviously not "income" ;23 yet where a wasting assets corporation is
involved the tenant should receive such proportion of the profits as are not neces-
sary to maintain unimpaired the principal of the trust.24  If this were not so the
direction by the teztator to award the income of such a company to the tenant
would be nullified. It is important in this connection to remark that where lan-
guage in the will shows a clear intent to distribute any increase to the trust fund
in a manner other than that normally employed by the courts, such language will
be decisive of the issue.2
As a correlative to the determination of the extent to which dividends are
composed of "profits" there is the important problem of ascertaining the intact
value of the stock. This is used as a basis for the apportionment of such profits
between income and corpus, since the life tenant is entitled to profits only to the
extent that this intact or original value of the trust fund is not impaired.2 6
Market value was early discarded as a standard,27 and until Dickinson's Estate 28
was decided, the actual or book value of the shares at the date of testator's death
was taken as the intact value.2 9  In that case the Supreme Court adjusted the
value by the consideration of factors other than the extent to which earnings had
accumulated at that time, further complicating the procedure in an attempt to
secure a greater measure of justice to the life tenant. In that case the corpus of
the estate consisted of shares in a fire insurance company which, during the life
tenancy, suffered an extremely large loss in the great San Francisco fire. A part
of the accumulated earnings held by the company at testator's death was thereby
dissipated, as were the total profits earned after his death. Some years later the
insurance company declared a stock dividend on the profits it had made subse-
quent to the fire. In apportioning the dividend the Court used as a basis an
adjusted intact value which was lower than the actual value of the shares at the
time of the testator's death. Use of this device reflected a desire of the court to
divide the burden of this extraordinary loss between life tenant and remainder-
man. To reach this goal the court credited to the life tenant only those earnings
made after the fire's occurrence. Since this action deprived the life tenant of the
20. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882). Cf. Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491, x24 Ati.
i66 (I924) (involving distribution of liberty bonds held by corporation).
21. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 2oo (I927).
22. That such conflict exists among the earlier cases is evident from a comparison of
the decisions cited in notes 23 and 24 infra.
23. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (882) (sale of franchise).
24. Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. 43, 20 Atl. 527 (i89o) ; Thompson's Estate, 153 Pa. 332,
26 Atl. 653 (0893). In both cases profits from the sale of assets (land) were awarded to
income. It was not until the decision in Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562
(I926), however, that a portion of the profit was awarded rightly to corpus in order to keep
the principal intact.
25. In Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 482, 67 Atl. 775 (29o7) scrip dividends were awarded
to income in accordance with the express direction of the testator.
26. "If a company declares a dividend . . . partially out of earnings and partially
out of principal a court of equity will apportion the dividend between the life tenant
and remainderman in such a way as to maintain intact the principal of the estate, only
giving the balance to the life tenant." McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, aT 84, io6 Atl. i89, at
192 (I919).
27. See note 12 supra.
28. 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352 (1926).
29. Stoke's Estate (No. i), 24o Pa. 277, 87 Ati. 971 (1913).
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earnings made betWeen the time of the testator's death and the date of the fire,
part of the loss was clearly placed on income. By charging against intact value
that portion of the loss not taken up by the diminution of income above described,
the court put the remaining burden on the corpus. Justice Kephart dissented 10
on the ground that the loss was an operating and not a capital loss, and as such
should be borne by the life tenant. As a result of this criticism, later opinions
have assumed that the determination of intact value demands an allowance for
any capital loss.31 It is submitted that this is at odds with the theory of Dickin-
son's Estate. The apportionment of the loss as well as the profits represented a
logical outgrowth of the equitable principles inherent in the doctrine of apportion-
ment. The majority opinion in that decision did not profess to distinguish be-
tween a capital and an operating loss. It was motivated rather by the desire to
do justice between the parties, a characteristic the Supreme Court has repeatedly
exhibited by its tendency to disregard the technical or corporate interpretations
of terms such as "income" or "capital" in order to effect a just result.32  It would
seem, therefore, that the apportionment of the loss in Dickinson's Estate was not
made on the basis of the capital rather than operating character of the loss but
rather on the theory that such an unusual loss should not be borne in toto by
either of the parties.1
3
In cases involving the rights of shareholders to subscribe to new shares as
a medium for the distribution of the corporation's earnings, the Supreme Court
has experienced some difficulty in adhering to the doctrine of Earp's Appeal 34
whether the shares had been subscribed for or the options sold. Although in an
early decision stock so acquired was awarded to the life tenant as income,3 5 a
later decision reached the opposite result.36 In the latter case an attempt was
made to distinguish stock rights from stock dividends, the rationale being that
whereas the issuance of new stock was an actual distribution of profits, stock
gained by the trust through exercise of its option to buy was not such a distribu-
tion, but served merely to render the identical surplus fund liable upon its division
to an increased number of shares. The fallacy of this attempted distinction is
inherent in the fact that there is no actual distribution of profits in either situation.
The reasoning applied to rights to subscribe is equally pertinent as to stock divi-
dends. In a subsequent decision the Supreme Court, while professing adherence
to the anomalous rule prohibiting the allocation to income of increment arising
out of stock rights, in fact awarded the stock so acquired to the life tenant.3 7 In
later decisions the Court has abandoned any pretext of distinguishing the two
3o. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, at 456, 132 Atl. 352, at 354 (1926). See a
criticism along the lines of the dissenting opinion in Note (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 618.
31. See Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 464, 139 Atl. 2oo, 2o3 (1927), where Justice
Kephart later stated that capital losses must be deducted from the intact value. Note, how-
ever, that the exact point has not been litigated since Dickinson's Estate.
32. In Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, at 470, 139 Atl. 2oo, at 205 (927), it was said:
. .. no matter what such accumulations may be called by the corporation or what form
they may assume, the names do not aid in determining the rights of the lif tenant and re-
mainderman to such income."
33. "Each interest in the stock was subject to so much of that risk as appertained to its
respective share in the capital and surplus. . . . Each must bear his own share of the
loss. . . " Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, at 453, 132 Atl. 352, at 353 (1926).
34. See statement in Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, at 466, 139 Atl. 2oo, at 203 (927)
to the effect that the Pennsylvania cases on this point are in conflict.
35. Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (I87O).
36. Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (3877). Accord: Biddle's Appeal, 99 Pa. 278 (1882);
Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 At. 438 (i891); Veech's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 373 (192o).
37. Eisner's Estate, I75 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577 (x896).
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situations, although the older cases were not expressly overruled. 38 The gradual
emergence of the tendency to include stock rights under the doctrine of Earp's
Appeal culminated in an express statement in Jones v. Integrity Trust Co.3 9 to
that effect. 40 At the present time, therefore, the two decisions are logically gov-
erned by the same principles, with the important exception that while an extraor-
dinary dividend is presumptively income, profit resulting from a sale of stock
rights or from stock acquired through exercise of the option to subscribe is said
to accrue to corpus unless the contrary can be proved. 41  The exception seems
anomalous but can be well understood when examined in the light of the past
history of the decisions in this field.
Although the life tenant had been repeatedly allotted a portion of a stock
dividend-admittedly not an actual division of profits-the Supreme Court, with
characteristic judicial stolidity illogically purported to adhere to a rule prohibiting
any allocation of profits to the life tenant until the corporation actually distributed
such profits. 42 It was thereby hampered when later faced with a situation where
an actual profit was realized by the estate by means of a sale of its holdings in
the corporation.. Since such profit did not result from a distribution of earnings
it was deemed necessary to award such increment to corpus,43 and this although
it had previously held the doctrine of apportionment applicable to a distribution
made by the corporation in process of liquidation. 44 In some few cases there had
been an award of such profits to income but only as a result of leaning heavily
on a strained interpretation of the testator's intention.4 5 The Supreme Court
later seized upon the decision apportioning proceeds of a liquidation to ameliorate
the rule against apportionment of the proceeds of a sale. A sale by the trustee
of the stock directly to the corporation which issued it was regarded as a liquida-
tion insofar as this particular shareholder was concerned, even though the com-
pany continued in business-a glaring fiction. But the court was thereby enabled
to apportion the proceeds of the sale according to the usual rule.46  It was not
until the decision in Nirdlinger's Estate 47 that a clear-cut ruling in favor of the
life tenant was sustained. Of course, as in the other related situations, the life
tenant will receive only such proportion of the proceeds as can fairly be traced
to profits accumulated by the corporation during his tenancy. He will not be
awarded any part of the proceeds due to increased earning power of the cor-
poration, goodwill or enhancement of the market value ;48 and, as in the case of
38. Stoke's Estate (No. i), 24o Pa. 277, 87 Atl. 971 (1913). To the same effect is
Stoke's Estate (No. 2), 240 Pa. 288, 87 Atl. 975 (1913).
39. 292 Pa. 149, 14o At. 862 (1928).
40. "We now definitely decide that, where the corporation gives to the trustees of an
estate the right to subscribe for new stock . . . the benefit resulting therefrom must be ap-
portioned in the same manner as an extraordinary dividend would be ;" Jones v. Integrity
Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, at 153, 14o Atl. 862, at 863 (1928). This dictum (no decision was
rendered because of lack of evidence as to the facts) was followed in Burton's Estate, 12 D.
& C. 6o5 (Pa. 1929).
41. See Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 At!. 295, 297 (1932).
42. See Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264, 269 (1877).
43. Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 31o8 (39O).
44. Connolly's Estate (No. I), 198 Pa. 137, 47 Atl. 1125 (igoi). That proceeds upon
liquidation will be apportioned according to the usual rule is well settled in Pennsylvania.
McCahan's Estate, 18 D. & C. 171 (Pa. 1933).
45. Park's Estate, 173 Pa. 190, 33 At. 884 (1896) ; Quay's Estate, 253 Pa. 8o, 97 Atl.
3O29 (3936).
46. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, io6 Atl. 189 (3939).
47- 290 Pa. 457, 139 At. 200 (927). Accord: Cassatt's Estate, 3O5 Pa. Super. 14, 158
AtI. 586 (932).
48. Packer's Estate (No. 1), 293 Pa. 194, 139 AtI. 867 (1927) ; see Waterhouse's Estate,
308 Pa. 422, 42, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932).
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stock rights, a presumption that the proceeds of the sale belong to principal and
not income will be raised.4" Nirdlinger's Estate has been criticized 50 as being an
unwarranted extension of the doctrine of Earp's Appeal since there had been no
distribution of profits as such by the corporation. It would seem, on the con-
trary, that the result is dictated by the basic theory of the Pennsylvania cases.
Whether or not the corporation formally distributes its accumulated earnings
should have no effect on the right of the life tenant to what is admittedly due
him, if an opportunity for a convenient division is presented.5 Transforming the
corporate holdings into cash by means of a sale, as in the case of a liquidation, is
in effect a more real distribution of profits than the distribution of a stock divi-
dend. The fact that for purposes of the corporate set-up the shareholder has no
right to earnings until formally distributed should have no application in this
field. That the application of the rule of apportionment to this situation will
make for inconvenience to trustees and for difficulty of computation, as has been
suggested, deserves little consideration; the Supreme Court in adopting the rule
of Earp's Appeal deliberately chose a course admittedly difficult of application
for the purpose of reaching an equitable result in each case.
5 2
The tendency shown in Nirdlinger's Estate will not be carried to the extreme
of forcing the trustee to sell the stock in order to apportion accumulated profits.
5 3
It would seem, however, that such an extension would be a logical one. In the
only case involving this point, the stock held in trust was replaced by an equal
number of shares of the corporation which had merged with another company. 4
The book value of the new shares was higher than that of the original shares.
An award of this increase was held error. The principal reason for the decision
was the fact that this situation was not one which the Supreme Court had held
to be covered by the apportionment doctrine. However, there seems to be no
valid legal rule supporting this result, beyond a technical one forbidding appor-
tionment until an actual distribution has occurred; since the same objection might
well be advanced in the situations where apportionment has been decreed, even
this point is clearly without force. It is interesting to note at this point that the
doctrine of apportionment is further limited in that it will not be applied to the
case of an ordinary cash dividend. 55 Here the dividend will be awarded to the
one entitled to the income at the time the dividend is declared, notwithstanding
49. See Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932).
5o. Note (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. Re,. 589.
51. "Nothing is done that, in the slightest, involves the financial structure of the com-
pany. When a trustee sells the stock of the company . . . he has physical possession of
the income, apart from any other consideration. The only screen held up to defeat the life
tenant is that the corporation did not formally declare it as a dividend, though it has every
such quality. . . . In such cases, the sale, in substance and effect, amounts to a distribu-
tion, as in the case of liquidation by a company. The court will disregard the form..
Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, at 472, 139 At. 2oo, at 2o6 (1927).
52. See Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 375 (857). In McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, at 84,
io6 At. i89, at ig1 (1919), it was stated: "... the difficulty of proving a fact has never
been held to deprive one of a right"
53. Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 AtI. 6o6 (x929).
54 As to the effect of an increase in value due to a merger there seems to be no definite
rule, owing to a dearth of decisions. In Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 154 Atl. 814 (931),
a stock dividend based on the consolidated surplus account of the two merged companies was
apportioned under the usual rule. The correctness of the decision seems questionable since
the account which was carried as surplus and taken over by the original company did not
represent income of that company which could accrue to the interest of the life tenant.
55. The dividing line between ordinary and extraordinary dividends is not clearly defined.
See Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 987, in which it is suggested at p. 989, note 20, that the
following circumstances seem material: (i) whether a regular dividend has also been declared
that year, (2) whether the regular dividend is larger or smaller, (3) whether the dividend
was declared for an unusual purpose.
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that the profits upon which the dividend is based may not have been earned
entirely during his tenancy. The theory that profits are not earned de die in dient
is classically advanced to support the rule,56 although this is not given any con-
sideration in the case of extraordinary dividends. Actually, however, the court
is motivated by the consideration that no great injustice can be done by following
an arbitrary rule in this situation since the sums involved are normally small and
cover but a brief period of time.57
In few other corners of the law is the adage "hard cases make bad law"
more applicable than in the field under discussion. The fact that the court, aided
only by vague documents, must contend with situations of the utmost complexity
in attempting to do justice between the two claimants has led many jurisdictions
to adopt an arbitrary rule which sacrifices the ideal of justice to judicial con-
venience. Many states have adopted the so-called "Massachusetts" rule which
awards all cash dividends to income, and all stock dividends to corpus.5 That
the intention of the testator is entirely disregarded where dividends are declared
in forms other than cash is obvious, since the life tenant will receive nothing.
The majority of jurisdictions, however, have followed the doctrine which has
now been crystallized into the "Pennsylvania" or "American" view. 59 The theo-
retical authority on the subject has unanimously declared itself in favor of the
Pennsylvania approach. 60 Such criticism as exists is directed exclusively against
various applications of the rule. Since application is necessarily difficult, it is not
surprising that the cases often seem conflicting on identical points. The great~st
measure of blame for the many uncertainties which cloud this part of the law,
however, should be directed against those who have drawn the wills or deeds
creating the trusts. Lawyers to whom such duties are relegated, by making more
specific the desires of the testator, can do much to relieve trustees and the courts
of the necessity of attacking these difficult problems with inadequate tools.
C.J.F.
TAXATION OF MORTGAGED REAL ESTATE-A great deal of legislation has
been passed recently relieving the condition of defaulting mortgagors.1 One
aspect of this problem has not received treatment-the problem of who should
bear the immediate burden of the taxes where the mortgagee has entered into
possession of the premises and is collecting the rents and profits. The taxes
are assessed to the record owner of the land,2 and it is his personal obligation to
56. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, io6 Ati. 189 (I919).
57. See Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 375 (1868).
58. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. ioi (1868) is the leading case. This view has been adopted
in the federal courts. Gibbons v.. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (i8go). It has been also incorporated
in the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, § 5. Kentucky courts have adopted an arbi-
trary rule which awards stock or cash dividends to the one entitled to receive the income at
the time the dividend was declared, without regard to the time it was earned, provided the
corpus is not thereby impaired. Cox v. Gaulbert's Trustee, 148 Ky. 407, 147 S. W. 25 (912).
59. For a comprehensive survey of the entire field, see annotations in 24 A. L. R. 9
(i93) ; 42 A. L. R. 448 (1926); 8I A. L. R. 542 (1932); 83 A. L. R. 1261 (I933).
6o. See MoRAWEvrz, PRIVATE COORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) §§ 467, 468, 471 ; 2 CooK, COR-
PORATTONS (8th ed. 1923) § 552; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 545a. See
also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) § 228, which advances both the Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts views as alternatives. In a comment to this section there are dis-
cussed the cases and treatment under each view.
i. Such as the Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency Act, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purd. Supp.
1934) tit. 21, § 8o6.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purd. Supp. 1934) tit. 72, § 5o2o-4o8 (b).
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pay them.8 If he fails to do so, the mortgagee in possession may pay them to
protect his security, and subsequently recover from the owner on the ground that
he is subrogated to the taxing power.4 In doing this the mortgagee is limited in
most jurisdictions to the procedure of adding the taxes to the mortgage debt and
recovering them on foreclosure.5 Thus, if it happens that the appraised valtib of
the land is more than the amount of the taxes and mortgage principal and interest
combined, the taxes are paid out of the proceeds of sale. In Pennsylvania, how-
ever, the mortgagee may sue for taxes he has paid in a separate action of
assumpsit.0 The problem is thus made more acute in this state, since it is not
necessary to foreclose to recover the taxes, and the mortgagee can remain in pos-
session until the debt is paid. He may thus, by remaining in possession indefi-
nitely, enjoy all the benefits of the land and collect the income, while avoiding
the payment of any of the taxes. Where the land has so decreased in value as
to be worth less than the amount of the mortgage, the record owner who has
been ousted from possession has only a worthless equity of redemption, and his
title carries with it nothing but the burden of taxation. Again, although it
appears to be well settled elsewhere that where the mortgagee is in possession for
the whole of the year, the rental income of the property may be applied to the
reduction of the mortgage interest or principal only after the full payment of
taxes," the Pennsylvania rule appears to be otherwise.9 A mortgagee may accord-
ingly milk the property indefinitely, keeping the entire income from the land
which he occupies to reduce his debt, and forcing the owner of the land to shoul-
der the entire burden of taxation. This note will deal primarily with the Penn-
sylvania phase of the problem.
The mortgagor's rights turn to some extent upon the question of occupancy.
Where the land is occupied by a tenant under a lease made prior to the mortgage,
the mortgagee can collect the rents under the lease by making demand upon the
tenant.10 This is a logical result under the conveyancing theory of mortgages,
which Pennsylvania follows, whereby the mortgage operates as a conveyance of
the reversion to the mortgagee, as between the parties, for all purposes necessary
to secure the debt." The conveyance necessarily carries with it title to the rent
under a lease payable to the reversion. Where, on the other hand, there is a tenant
3. May's Estate, 218 Pa. 64, 67 Atl. 12o (19o7); King v. Mount Vernon Bldg. Ass'n,
io6 Pa. 165 (1884).
4. Brown v. Simons, 44 N. H. 475 (1863) ; Baranowski v. Wetzel, 174 App. Div. 507,
i61 N. Y. Supp. 53 (2d Dep't I916) ; Lysle v. Williams, 15 S. & R. x35 (Pa. 1827) ; Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Bergson, 307 Pa. 44, 159 Atl. 32 (1932) ; see Note (1929) 61 A. L. R. 587.
5. 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 885; Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 1366, 1388.
6. Hogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255 (i8i); Republic B. & L. Ass'n v. Webb, 12 Pa.
Super. 545 (19oo) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bergson, 307 Pa. 44, 159 Atl. 32 (1932) ; DeHaven
v. Roscon B. & L. Ass'n, 1o7 Pa. Super. 459, 164 At. 69 (1933).
7. Wells v. Van Dyke, 109 Pa. 330 (1885) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 886.
8. Gorham v. Farson, 19 Ill. 425, io N. E. i (1887) ; see Schenck v. Kelley, 88 Ind. 444,
449 (1882) ; Sibley v. Garland, 239 Mass. 20, 30, 131 N. E. 466, 47o (1921) ; Merchants' and
Traders' Realty Co. v. Stern, ioi N. J. Eq. 629, 633, 138 Atl. 697, 698 (1927) ; Ten Eyck v.
Craig, 62 N. Y. 406, 422 (875); Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 20, I18 N. W. 174, 177 (i9o8).
9. Girard Trust Co. v. Beckman Bros., IS D. & C. 659 (Pa. 1933). But see Integrity
Trust Co. v. St. Rita B. & L., 112 Pa. Super. 343, 348, 171 Atl. 283, 285 (i934), aff'd wcithoitt
opinion Feb. 4, 1935; Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, ii W. N. C. 284 (Pa. i881), aff'd,
Commonwealth Bank v. Shoemaker, 13 W. N. C. 255 (Pa. 1883) (opinion not adopted on ap-
peal on grounds defendant was not mortgagee in possession).
io. See Note (ig3i) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 269, 274.
it. See Sweeney v. Arrowsmith, 43 Pa. Super. 268, 272 (igo9) ; Lloyd, The Mortgage
Theory of Pennsylvania (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 43, 57; I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed.
T928) § 54.
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occupying under a lease made subsequent to the mortgage, the mortgagee's right
to the rent 12 is based upon other grounds. His title is superior to that of the
mortgagor, or of the owner of the land, and it is not denying the title of the land-
lord for the tenant to pay over the rents to the mortgagee. Where the mortgagor
or his alienee is in possession, the mortgagee may take possession of the land by
an action of ejectment."3 In all these situations, the mortgagee may retain his
possession, once acquired, until the mortgage debt is extinguished;14 there is no
way by which he may be made to foreclose.
A mortgagee in possession collects the rents as quasi-trustee for the owner,15
and is under a duty of accounting for them.' 6 He may, of course, appropriate
them to the reduction of the mortgage principal or interest at any time before
foreclosure; but until he does so the money remains the property of the owner
of the land. 7  Thus, if the mortgagee forecloses for the total amount of the
mortgage without applying the rents which he has collected to its reduction, these
rents must be paid over 18 unless the mortgagee has some claim against the owner.
He has such a claim where he is forced to pay back taxes on foreclosure and the
proceeds of the sale are not sufficient to cover the taxes in addition to the mort-
gage; 19 in such a case the rents may be applied to their payment. They may also
be used to pay a deficiency if the owner is personally liable on the mortgage.29
But since an alienee is not personally liable in the absence of a provision to that
effect, 2' he is not liable for a deficiency. In this situation the residue of the rents
after the payment of back taxes must be paid over to the alienee.2 2  Once the rents
have been appropriated to the reduction of the mortgage, they of course become
the property of the mortgagee, and he is no longer under a duty to account for
them.
A distinction is made between the case where the mortgagee is in possession
for the whole of the tax year and where he is in possession for only part of it.
In the latter case, rents need not be used for the payment of taxes, but may all be
appropriated to the reduction of the mortgage principal or interest.2 3 This is so
even where the mortgagee is in possession on the assessment day,2 4 for the taxes
are assessed to the record owner. Where, on the other hand, the mortgagee has
been in possession for the whole of the tax year, a different situation arises. As
has been pointed out, in the majority of jurisdictions outside of Pennsylvania the
22. See Note (0931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 269, 274.
13. Fluck v. Replogle, 13 Pa. 405 (1850).
14. See note 7, supra.
25. See Integrity Trust Co. v. St. Rita B. & L. Ass'n, n2 Pa. Super. 343, 348, 171 Atl.
283,285 (i934).
i6. Integrity Trust Co. v. St. Rita B. & L. Ass'n, X12 Pa. Super. 343, 171 Atl. 283 (1934).
Keller, J., at p. 350, 171 Atl. at 286:
"It is not a, case of the mortgagee agreeing to apply his own, fuids to the taxes on the
real estate of another, but rather agreeing to apply the funds of the owner, placed in his
(the mortgagee's) hands as additional security for the mortgage debt . .," citing
JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 868.
17. Provident Trust Co. v. Judicial B. & L. Ass'n, 112 Pa. Super. 352, 272 Atl. 287
(934) ; P. 355, 171 AtI. at 289:
"The rents so received by the mortgagee do not become his individual property until he
has appropriated them to the interest or principal of the mortgage."
18. Integrity Trust Co. v. St. Rita B. & L. Ass'n, 222 Pa. Super. 343, 271 Atl. 283
(934); Provident Trust Co. v. Judicial B. & L., 112 Pa. Super. 352, 171 Atl. 287 (2934).
29. Securities Guaranty Corp. v. Pacheto Co., 112 Pa. Super. 36o, 271 Atl. 291 (2934).
20. See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purd. Supp. 1934) tit. 21, § 8o6, i.
21. Baum v. Tonkin, 22o Pa. 569 (1885).
22. See note i8, supra.
23. Securities Guaranty Corp. v. Pacheto Co., 122 Pa. Super. 36o, 172 Atl. 291 (934).
24. Provident Trust Co. v. Judicial B. & L. Ass'n, 222 Pa. Super. 352, 171 Atl. 287
(934); see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purd. Supp. 1934) tit. 72, § 5020-408 (b).
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mortgagee must pay the taxes from the rents which he collects, and only the net
rents may be appropriated to the mortgage, since the mortgagee in possession is
held to the standard of care of a provident owner.25 There have been dicta to the
same effect in Pennsylvania. In Integrity Trust Co. v. St. Rita B. & L. Ass'n,
26
a recent case in the Superior Court, the mortgagee collected the rents for two
years under an agreement with the owner, an alienee, to pay the taxes and apply
the surplus to the reduction of interest and principal of the mortgage. Keller,
J., speaking for the court, said:
". .. we think it is the law in this state that whenever a mortgagee, pur-
suant to demand, is collecting the rents from the mortgaged premises, and
does so for the entire year, and has in his possession out of said rents suffi-
cient funds, after paying necessary repairs and expenses, to pay the taxes
on the property, it is his duty to do so." 27
In that case, however, the rents not having been appropriated to the mortgage,
they were still the property of the owner, and could be set off against the mort-
gagee's claim for taxes which he had been forced to pay; this is, therefore, dictum
so far as concerns rents which iuzve been appropriated. All of the cases cited
were from other jurisdictions.
In Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank,28 a case decided some fifty years ago
in a lower court, it was stated that
"a mortgagee in possession is to be treated as owner, so far as concerns the
payment of current taxes." 29
It was subsequently decided in that case that the defendant was not a mortgagee
in possession, and the Court of Common Pleas disregarded the language.30 The
reasoning in the lower court was that since a mortgagee in possession cannot
acquire a good title at a tax sale as against the owner, therefore he must be under
a duty to pay the taxes; if there were no such duty there would be no basis for
the disability.
Opposed to these dicta stands a direct holding. In Girard Trust Co. v.
Beckman Bros.3L a 1933 case in the Court of Common Pleas, the mortgagee col-
lected the rents for two years before the sheriff's sale, but paid no taxes. He
credited the rents collected to the reduction of the mortgage. However, he had
to pay the taxes for the two years he was in possession at the sheriff's sale, and
this not bringing enough to cover both mortgage and taxes, he brought suit against
the owner to recover the latter. In holding that the mortgagee could recover
without setting off the rents he had collected, the court said:
"We believe that plaintiff could have rightfully applied the total of rents
collected against its mortgage debt." 32
If this lower court holding should become the law in Pennsylvania, the
mortgagee could enjoy all the material benefits of ownership over a period of
years, receiving the entire income from the property, and the title holder, who is
owner in name only, would be forced to bear the burden of taxation. Where the
25. See note 8, supra.
26. 112 Pa. Super. 343, 7i Atl. 283 ('934).
27. Id. at 349, 17r Atl. at 285.
28. II W. N. C. 284 (Pa. 1881).
29. Id. at 285.
30. Commonwealth Bank v. Shoemaker, 13 W. N. C. 255 (Pa. 1883).
31. i8 D. & C. 659 (Pa. 1933).
32. Id. at 661.
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rents exceed by very little the interest payments on the mortgage, it would take
many years for the mortgage principal to be paid off. The injustice is apparent.
Adoption of the contrary rule would achieve a more desirable result. If the
mortgagee is forced to pay the taxes from the rents which he collects, he will still
have the right to remain in possession until the mortgage is extinguished.33 But
the advantage to him will be so much less that the problem as a practical matter
will cease to exist. The net rents will not suffice to reduce the mortgage to any
material extent, and in many cases the mortgage will increase from year to year.
The expense and trouble of collecting the rents, coupled with the duties of a
mortgagee in possession, will make it uneconomic for a mortgagee to remain long
in possession, and thereby prevent him from milking the property. There is no
reason why Pennsylvania should not follow the majority on this point.
84
Where the mortgagee remains in possession for part of the year only, and
then forecloses, or where he forecloses without having been in possession, the
former owner is forced to pay the taxes for the entire year,35 although he may
have been owner only for a few days or weeks of that year.3 6 The argument is
often advanced by the owner that he should be held liable to the mortgagee only
for his proportion of the taxes up to the day of the sale.3 7 But the courts reason
that since the taxes for the entire year are due in advance on the assessment day
of each year,38 the mortgagee, having paid the taxes, is subrogated to the rights
of the taxing power.3 9 In this they lose sight of the reason for making the taxes
payable in advance, which is to facilitate the collection of taxes and avoid con-
fusion; as between the taxing power and the owner the taxes are due in advance.
It was never intended to establish the rights as between the owner and third
parties. Subrogation is based upon equity,40 so where a party, through his right
of subrogation, gains more than that to which he is equitably entitled, he should
be compelled to reimburse the other party. In this case, where the mortgagee
forecloses in the early part of the year, and the owner pays the taxes for the entire
year, the mortgagee is acquiring many months of ownership of the land free from
taxes through no other right than his right of subrogation. It is only equitable
that the mortgagee should have to pay his proportion of the taxes.
Under the existing law it is much more profitable for the mortgagee to fore-
close as early in the year as possible, particularly where he is not collecting the
rents, for he will then have ownership of the property for a longer period free
from taxes. Since the owner cannot force him to foreclose, the mortgagee delays
foreclosure when possible until after the assessment day.41 In Girard Trust Co.
v. Beckman Bros., the mortgagee foreclosed on the third of January, 1933, and
collected the taxes for the entire year of 1933, thus getting all but three days of
the year tax-free. In the ordinary sale of real estate, the vendee pays his pro-
33. See note 2, supra.
34. Counsel for plaintiff in Girard Trust Co. v. Beckman Bros. cited Shoemaker v.
Bank, which the court refused to follow because the opinion had not been adopted on appeal.
But, as has been pointed out, the opinion was not adopted because the defendant was not a
mortgagee in possession; the reasoning itself was not repudiated.
35. Provident Trust Co. v. Judicial B. & L. Ass'n, 112 Pa. Super. 352, 171 Atl. 287
(934).
36. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Beckman Bros., i8 D. & C. 659 (Pa. 1933) (Mortgagee fore-
closed on January 3, 1933, and recovered taxes which he had paid for entire year of 1933)
Theobald v. Sylvester, 27 Pa. Super. 362 (1905) (mortgagee foreclosed early in February);
Provident Trust Co. v. Judicial B. & L. Ass'n, 112 Pa. Super. 352, 171 Atl. 287 (3934)
(mortgagee acquired title early in March).
37. Ibid; Republic B. & L. Ass'n v. Webb, 12 Pa. Super. 545 (1900).
38. Theobald v. Sylvester, 27 Pa. Super. 362 (9o5).
39. See note 4, supra.
40. i BRANDr, SuRarsHn, (3d ed. I905) § 289.
43. See cases cited note 37, supra.
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portion of the taxes by contract with the vendor. But in the case of foreclosure,
the owner is in no position to contract with the mortgagee. Since the parties
to an ordinary sale recognize the taxes as a factor in determining the value of the
property, it is only right that they should be recognized where there is a forced
sale.
The most logical remedy for this practice is to give the owner some way of
forcing the mortgagee to foreclose. He should have the power of obtaining a
rule to foreclose upon the mortgagee, the taxes assessed after the day of the
allowance of the rule to be borne by the mortgagee if the rule is made absolute.
Such a remedy would serve a double purpose. It would prevent the delay of the
foreclosure until most convenient to the mortgagee, and could work no injustice
upon him. It would also prevent the mortgagee from milking the property over
a long period of time under the practices pointed out.
The need for some such legislation is very real at the present time. Already
the legislature of Pennsylvania has recognized the prevalence of uneconomic
real estate by a provision in the Banking Code of 1933 that a receiver "may, ...
with leave of court, convey title to any 'other holder of a mortgage or a lien
against property in his possession, when it shall appear that to continue to hold
such property is burdensome . . . to the estate." 42 No remedy is given, how-
ever, by which the receiver can force the holder of the lien to take title to such
property. The rule to foreclose would be an adequate remedy in this case, and
might be established by rule of court. The value of the remaining taxes should
then be added to the appraised value of -the land, restraining the mortgagee from
recovering more than an amount of the taxes proportionate to the period of the
year during which the owner held title.
When the owner of land finds himself in one of the situations discussed
where it is uneconomic for him to keep the land, the obvious way of avoiding
taxation is to rid himself of title to the property. The practical difficulties in his
way, however, are many. It is almost impossible to find a bona fide purchaser
since the land produces no income and the encumbrances in most instances exceed
the value of the reversion. An offer to convey title to the mortgagee is usually
met with refusal, since the mortgagee by accepting would lose his right to a
deficiency judgment;'he naturally prefers to remain a mortgagee, since under the
present law he may have all of the benefits of ownership without the expense of
the taxes. The only alternative is to make a conveyance without consideration
if the owner can find someone who is willing to take the title.
Conveyance to a'straw man for the avoidance of taxation or other liabilities
has often been attempted.43 In most instances the grantee is judgment-proof so
that he is not injured by taking title, and the former owner retains a secret trust
giving him such benefits as may come from the property. In practically all
instances, however, ithe grantor has retained some interest in the property, so
that the conveyance was nothing but a sham.44 The courts have been laudably
quick to detect such practices, and have held the grantor liable for the taxes as
the real owner.45  No cases have been discovered where the intention of the
42. Art. VII, § 715, Banking' Code of Penna. (1933), PA. STAT. ANN. (Purd. Supp.
1934) tit. 71, § 733-715.
43. Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Second Phoenix B. & L., 17 Pa. Super. 270 (1goo) ; King v. Mt.
Vernon Bldg. Ass'n, 18 Pa. Super. 635 (igO); Penna. Co. v. Bergson, 3o7 Pa. 44, 159 At.
32 (1932) ; Girard Trust Co. v. Beckman Bros., 18 D. & C. 659 (Pa. 1933) ; North Phila.
Trust Co. v. Heinel Bros., 315 Pa. 385, 172 Atl. 692 (1934).
44. Rawle v. Renshaw, 15 Pa. Super. 488 (19oo) ; Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Second Phoenix
B. & L. Ass'n, 17 Pa. Super. 270 (i9or) ; Bergdoll v. Pitts (No. 1), 41 Pa. Super. 257 (199o).
45. Girard Trust Co. v. Beckman Bros., 18 D. & C. 659 (Pa. 1933) ; North Phila. Trust
Co. v. Heinel Bros., 315 Pa. 385, 172 At. 692 (1934) ; see Pennsylvania Co. v. Bergson, 3o7
Pa. 44, 53, 159 Atl. 32, 34 (1932).
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grantor was ,to rid himself of all interest in the land, or where the court has
recognized his intention, and the owner has thus defeated his own ends by the
retention of this interest. For example, in New Haven Savings Bank v.
Atwater,46 an owner conveyed title to an irresponsible person out of the juris-
diction by a- recorded deed between a foreclosure decree and sale, for the purpose
of avoiding an assessment which occurred shortly after the decree. He neglected
to inform the grantee of the conveyance, and the court held that lit would not
presume an acceptance, since it would be of no benefit to the grantee, and since
the conveyance was nothing but a subterfuge to avoid the taxes for wlch the
owner was liable. The retention of an interest by each of these conveyances has
made the grantor the real owner of the property, and there were good grounds
for holding him liable for the taxes.
If, on the other hand, it were proved that the owner intended to rid himself
of every interest there would be no such basis for taxation. There is theoretically
no reason why an owner who wished to avoid the taxes on property could not
give it away, provided he could successfully show that he no longer had any
connection with the land. The mere fact that the purpose of the conveyance is
to avoid the taxes should not invalidate it. Yet the attitude of the courts toward
such transactions has invariably been to look with disfavor upon them, and to
hold that as between the parties the conveyance is good, but for the purpose of
avoiding taxation a nullity. This attitude is illustrated by an interesting case in
Missouri.4 7 The owner of land abutting upon a street conveyed, for good con-
sideration, a narrow strip of land immediately bordering upon the street. The
vendee collected his rents from the strip, and both parties recognized the sale as
valid. Shortly after this, lots abutting upon the street were assessed for im-
provements, the assessments being based in part upon the depth of the lots.
Since in this case the depth of the lot abutting was diminished to three feet by
the conveyance, the assessment was greatly reduced. The vendee tendered taxes
based on the size of his lot, but the court held that since the conveyance was
purely for the purpose of avoiding taxation it would not be recognized for tax
purposes, There, however, the vendor retained his interest in the major portion
of the land, while a land owner conveying all of his land away retains no interest
that can be taxed. Many conveyances without consideration have been made of
late, especially by building and loan associations where the land is worthless to
them, and the problem will become pressing. The conclusion seems inescapable
that there is no possible ground for taxation of the grantor, and that the taxes
may be levied only against the grantee, even though he be judgment-proof.
Another ingenious device which has been used is the organization, by the
owner, of a corporation whose purposes are stated to be the purchase and sale
of land, to take title to the property. The entire corporation assets are expended
in the purchase of the land, and the former owner takes back a purchase-money
mortgage. There is, of course, no payment under the mortgage, and the bogus
mortgagee enters into possession under it and collects the rents. The taxes are
assessed against the corporation, but as there are no corporate assets and the
stockholders are not individually liable for the debts of the corporation, they can-
not be collected. This device has not been passed upon by the courts, but it
seems likely that they will hold the former owner to be the real owner and assess
the taxes to him, notwithstanding the title in the corporation. Again, there has
been an interest retained by the owner, and there is a good basis for taxing him.
But if the purpose were merely to get rid of the property, and the owner retained
46. 51 Conn. 429 (1884).
47. Stifel v. Brown, 24 M;o. App. lO2 (1887). Two other cases having very similar facts
are Fass v. Seehawer, 6o Wis. 525 (1884) and Ransom v. City of Burlington, III Iowa 77,
82 N. W. 427 (19oo).
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no interest, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that there is no ground on
which the former owner can be taxed. If the suggestions which have been made
to relieve the condition of mortgagees are adopted, there will be no need of such
conveyances where the property is uneconomic because of the encumbrances upon
it. But even under the present law, the courts should recognize a conveya'nce,
though for the purpose of avoiding the taxes, where no interest is retained, as
good for all purposes; otherwise the legislature should devise some means
whereby the land may be abandoned or deeded to the taxing sovereignty.
Two main problems have been presented. The first is the question of how
the owner of land can compel the mortgagee to bear his proportion of the taxes
which have been assessed against the owner. The second is the problem of
avoiding- the assessment of taxes where the land has become a burden upon
the owner, either because of the collection of the rents by the mortgagee and
the necessity of the record owner paying the taxes, or because the land is so
reduced in value that the taxes exceed the income. In either case the existing
remedies are clearly inadequate, and realization of this fact must be brought home
to the courts and the legislature.
T. R. W., Jr.
